

I. F. Stone's Weekly

VOL. III, NUMBER 5

FEBRUARY 21, 1955



WASHINGTON, D. C.

15 CENTS

Bigger News in Some Ways Than the Malenkov-Bulganin Shift

A Startling New Moscow Bid on Germany?

The *Weekly* is forced abjectly to confess that it hasn't a single secret pipeline into the Kremlin, and not the slightest reliable idea as to what the shift from Malenkov to Bulganin means. We are amused, however, by the unexpected and politically posthumous canonization of Malenkov by Secretary Dulles in his Foreign Policy Association address last Wednesday night. Only a few weeks ago, in a year-end statement called "Balancing the Books for 1954," the Secretary said of the Soviet Union "Hostile forces remain strong and implacable. They are operating with even greater guile than heretofore." This was in accord with the State Department's line since Stalin's death which was (1) that nothing had changed in Moscow but (2) that if there appeared to be a relaxation this was only apparent and represented a "New Look" which made the Kremlin more diabolically dangerous than ever.

But now Mr. Dulles sees in the "despotic disarray" and "elemental personal struggle for power" in Moscow "the outlines of a basic policy difference." On one side were those "who are primarily concerned with the welfare, security and greatness of the Soviet Union and its people" and on the other those who "would have the Soviet Union and its power serve primarily as a tool of International Communism." Temporarily the moderates, the good Communists (what a heresy is here implied!) have lost while the conspirators (Bulganin is thus a kind of neo-Trotskyite) have won. Mr. Dulles thinks that some day "Russians of stature will patriotically put first their national security and the welfare of their people." Then—happy day—negotiation will be possible! We hope the Kremlin will not take this too seriously. They might embarrass Mr. Dulles by promoting Malenkov again.

Like The Only Good Injun

It might be said that Mr. Dulles's notion is that the only good Russian is a demoted one. His day dream implies that a "tough" regime in Moscow must be one which is concerned with advancing Communism elsewhere. He would have us assume that a Soviet regime interested only in the U.S.S.R. and its people would not object to being ringed by American atomic bomber bases. The fact is, of course, that from the very beginning of the Revolution its extremism, harshness and suspicion had as much to do with the unrelenting hostility of the outside world as with its own Russian and Bolshevik heritage. Fear of a rearmed Germany and a justified suspicion of people like Mr. Dulles are driving the Soviet regime back toward a tougher policy. This is a great relief to the State Department, which prefers an intransigent Moscow. Permanent hostility is so much easier, and politically more comfortable, than negotiation and peaceful co-existence.

The problem of arranging the succession in the new type of "monarchy" which the Communist dictatorships represent is not an easy one. "Democratic centralism" in practice has become rigid control from the top in the Communist parties; "collective leadership" is more difficult to maintain than one-man rule; in practice proletarian dictatorship tends to breed a kind of Marxist Frank Hague or political boss. All things considered, after so many years of Stalin, his successors are doing much better than their enemies expected. It would be very serious and create world instability if they proved unable to cope with the problem of a permanent succession. New surprises are not to be excluded.

An Historic Resolution

In the meantime, it would be better if public opinion in this country gave up those deliciously morbid reflections with which ever since 1917 it has foreseen, just around the corner, the collapse of the Revolution. It is more important to focus on the really dramatic but widely ignored prospect of a new and revolutionary offer from Moscow to settle the German problem. In Warsaw on February 6 a Communist controlled "International Conference on European Peace and the German Problem" with delegates from all the Soviet countries passed a resolution which is bigger news in some ways than the shift from Malenkov to Bulganin. This promises the withdrawal of the Soviet army from Poland along with all occupation troops from Germany; free democratic elections in Germany as proposed by Sir Anthony Eden at the Berlin conference on January 29 of last year; and an Austrian peace treaty. This is Moscow's highest bid yet for a "return to Potsdam"—a neutralized Germany outside any military coalition, with its territories "guaranteed by other European nations and by the United States."

If this is soon embodied in a formal offer from Moscow, it may upset the Adenauer regime in Germany. The American press has completely underplayed the resistance to rearmament in the Reich and the fears aroused by Molotov's threats that acceptance of the London and Paris agreements will shut the door permanently on the hope of a reunified Germany. The Soviet offer would mean a voluntary "rollback." The withdrawal of the Red army from Germany, Poland and Austria would mark the end of the abnormal situation left by the war. The Eden plan would provide really free elections in the Reich. For millions in England and France, a Soviet offer on the lines of the Warsaw resolution would also lay the spectre of a rearmed Reich. Moscow obviously is prepared either to make a grand settlement on Germany or to play it rough.

The Hidden History of the Formosan Crisis III

How Ike and Dulles Blocked An Independent Democratic Formosan Policy ...

Washington—A confession was made to the Senate by Kefauver the day it ratified the mutual security pact with Chiang Kai-shek. This confession will make it easier to understand just what happened in the three hectic weeks between the Monday, January 24, when Eisenhower upset the Hammarskjold negotiations with Peiping by asking Congress for authority if necessary to make preventive war on the Chinese mainland and last Monday when the UN Security Council suspended its efforts to achieve a cease-fire in the Formosa straits.

Kefauver, one of the six Senators to oppose the treaty with Chiang, said he had voted for the earlier Formosan war authority asked by the President "reluctantly and against my better judgment" and because he had been given to understand that it would be followed by quite a different resolution. This was S. J. Res. 55, sponsored by Kefauver, Humphrey, Sparkman, Morse, Mansfield, Fulbright, Lehman, Magnuson, Neuberger and Hill. This resolution said the U.S. would "welcome intervention by the United Nations" to bring about a cease-fire and "a definitive settlement of the future status of Formosa and the Pescadores."

According to Kefauver, something like a promise had been

Quite A Boil

"Mr. Wiley. In substance, the executive branch has said that we can either defend the United States in the Straits of Formosa, now, or we may have to defend it later in San Francisco Bay. That is what the question boils down to and . . . that is why I am in favor of this treaty [with Chiang Kai-shek].

—U.S. Senate, Feb. 9, Con. Rec. 1173

given and broken. The Tennessean told the Senate he had voted for the joint resolution asked by the President because "prior to the vote" on it "I was given to understand—and I think most other Senators so understood"—that this other United Nations resolution "would be considered *and agreed to* by the Senate" the following week. (The italics are added.) Instead the resolution was buried in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Freezing the Situation in Advance

The basic reason for not calling up that resolution for a vote is that it would have been more difficult afterwards to persuade the Senate to ratify the mutual security pact with Chiang. For as Kefauver said, the pact "by inferentially agreeing" that Chiang had title to Formosa "might make it impossible for the United Nations to work out any solution of this problem." The Senate could hardly have voted one week to ask the UN to bring about "a definitive settlement of the future status of Formosa" and then, before waiting for such a settlement to be attempted, ratify a mutual security pact promising to keep Chiang in possession of Formosa and

As Seen From The Other Side

"It is the armed forces of the United States which have for many years systematically violated the air space and territorial waters of China, and not the armed forces of China which have violated the air space and territorial waters of the United States; it is the U.S. fleet which has virtually blockaded the Chinese coast, and it is not the Chinese fleet which has made its appearance off San Francisco or New York."

—Sobolev, the Soviet member of the UN Security Council, in the Formosa debate, Jan. 31

One Good Reason For A Small Army

"Of course, if Mr. Vinson, Mr. Gavin, and the other fire eaters of the [House Armed Services] committee, wish to fight another war on the Asiatic continent, there will be need for a huge army. It should be added, however, that the best of all reasons for following Mr. Eisenhower's suggestion is that the smaller the army, the less our fire eaters will be tempted to send our men to war on the Asiatic mainland where a war will surely cost us more than we can hope to gain from it."

—Editorial in Col. McCormick's Chicago Tribune, Feb. 3 (and for once we agree with him).

the Pescadores. It would have been too obvious that we were freezing the situation in advance.

Indeed this is exactly what we have done. During the past six months the aim of the Dulles-Radford-Knowland team—for in this they are a team—has been to freeze the status of Formosa and *prevent* an international solution of the problem. This is the main thread for those who would find their way through the labyrinth of Far Eastern developments. By following it we may see the function played by the President's war powers message of January 24 in stampeding a Democratic Senate into accepting the mutual security pact with Chiang.

The mutual defense treaty with Chiang was signed on December 2. A memorandum on the proposed treaty was prepared for Democratic members of the Senate by Benjamin V. Cohen, who was counsellor of the State Department under Secretaries Byrnes and Marshall. This began to circulate widely here at the end of December. (The full text of the memo and a later note added to it may be found at pages 1183-5 of the Congressional Record for February 9.) The Cohen memorandum argued that "the treaty as presented would be more of an obstacle than a help in working for a peaceful settlement" and that "before attempting to agree on any mutual defense treaty for this disturbed area" the U.S. seek through the UN for a cease-fire "so that it will be clear that we are seeking peace and not trying to shield Formosa and the Pescadores while attacks on the mainland are in course of preparation there."

No Real Curb on Chiang

This last was a reference to the fact, as pointed out by the memo, that there was nothing in the treaty nor in Mr. Dulles's explanations of it which would prevent Chiang from attempting by force to extend his power to the mainland and thereby perhaps dragging the U.S. into war with China. When the Secretary of State was asked about this very point at press conference, he could say only "we expect that there will be worked out practical arrangements so that neither will take action in this area which would jeopardize the other and that we could generally act in an agreed pattern of conduct. . . . We would not expect, nor would the Chinese Nationalists expect to act rashly. . . . We anticipate . . . a great deal of consultation and agreement." This ambiguous phrasing "in no way suggests," the Cohen memorandum said, "that an attack on the mainland by the Chinese Nationalists from Formosa" would be a violation of the treaty.

In the wake of the memorandum, as Senator Lehman said during debate February 9 on the pact, "there appeared to develop a considerable resistance, both in public circles and in the Senate, to fundamental aspects of the treaty. Then, suddenly, President Eisenhower sent the Congress a message" asking special war powers in the Formosan straits.

The Senator did not develop the inference suggested by the sequence of events. But the war alarms stirred by the

We Will Be Glad to Send Free Sample Copies of the Three Formosa Pieces

... The Flim-Flam in Those "Understandings" Chiang Needn't Understand

Poor Track Material By Now

"Mr. MORSE. On the basis of such military facts as I have ever heard discussed, I am not enthusiastic about the argument as to what these great allies of ours, the Nationalist Chinese will do if we become involved in war. I think the chief thing they will do will be to run. However, they will not be able to run as fast as they ran off the mainland of China, because they are older."

—U.S. Senate, Feb. 9, Con. Rec. 1179

message created an atmosphere in which calm consideration of the treaty became politically impossible. Logically, as Lehman said, "passage of the [special war powers] resolution certainly eliminated the necessity of a treaty with Chiang." The resolution gave the President more power to defend Formosa than he would have under the treaty. But emotionally it became difficult to question the treaty so soon after approving the war powers resolution. So a treaty which may some day involve our country in World War III was reported by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee after hearing but one witness, the Secretary of State, and ratified by the Senate with but one day of debate.

The Pact Is More Dangerous

Yet the pact, though less dramatic, is more dangerous than the war powers resolution. The resolution is a unilateral declaration we can rescind at any time; indeed by its terms the special war powers of the President to defend Formosa expire "when the President shall determine that the peace and security of the area is reasonably assured . . . by action of the United Nations or otherwise. . . ." But by ratifying the pact, the Senate (as Lehman said) was "binding our country not only for the present, to meet the present situation, but binding us with the bonds of constitutional strength far into the indefinite future, to meet situations which we cannot possibly foresee today." The pact serves the purpose of those who do not want to see a peaceful settlement negotiated. It sharply reduces the area of possible bargaining. It ties Chiang securely to our national apron-strings.

This is well understood in the Senate, but few had the courage to say so openly. As Morse said of his colleagues, during the one-day debate "I think they ought to be agreeing with me on the floor of the Senate, as well as in the cloak-room." The Oregonian showed himself by far the ablest and the bravest member of the U.S. Senate in the fight on the war powers resolution and again on the treaty. All who believe in peace are deeply in his debt.

Ostensibly Morse spoke only for a handful. Only Langer and Lehman voted with him against the war powers resolution. Only three others, Chavez, Gore and Kefauver, joined them in the final vote against the pact. But the votes were no index in this case to the real feelings of the Senate. Morse's stature rose among his colleagues as well as in the country. There were many signs that but for the skillfully rung war alarms the treaty with Chiang would have had hard going.

Byrd Splits With George

The most striking was the way Byrd and Russell reacted. These two with George make up a triumvirate of Southern conservatives which works closely together. They hold the chairmanships of three key committees: Finance (Byrd), Foreign Relations (George) and Armed Services (Russell). They almost never disagree and when they do they usually keep the disagreement to themselves. While George's influence swung the day for the resolution and the pact, Russell was silent and Byrd, though dissuaded from speaking, did file

a scorching statement opposing the direction of Far Eastern policy, calling the President's resolution "a predated declaration of war" and bitterly criticizing Chiang. Byrd was one of the 13 Senators who voted for the Morse-Lehman amendment to cut the offshore islands and preventive war power from the grant of authority to the President. He was also one of the ten who voted for the Morse amendment which would have removed from the pact with Chiang those provisions which make it possible "by mutual agreement" to extend American protection to areas other than Formosa and the Pescadores.

The failure of the influential Southern conservatives to speak up in support of George during the debate was significant. One of them, Stennis of Mississippi, told the Senate, "I am not voting for the joint resolution as a military alliance in any way with Nationalist China, nor as a police action against the spread of Asiatic communism."

The temper of the Senate was also indicated by the failure of any Senator to defend Chiang against the serious charges made against him on the floor, and the complete disappearance from the debate of the delusion that he might some day "liberate" the mainland. It was a sour and uncomfortable Senate which gave the President the emergency powers he asked and then ratified the mutual security pact Dulles had

Morse Sums Up

Mr. MORSE. I have opposed the [Formosa] treaty because I believe it increases the danger of war. I have opposed the treaty because I believe it complicates the final determination of juridical rights to Formosa. I have opposed the treaty because I think it indirectly places in the Nationalist Chinese a sanction upon the sovereign rights over Formosa. I have opposed the treaty because I do not think we should enter into a so-called treaty with a government in Formosa which is a government of military occupation, which we, in effect, have helped to impose upon millions of native Formosans, without their having any right to self-government in connection with such imposition."

—U.S. Senate, Feb. 9, Con. Rec. 1185

negotiated. But the result, as Adlai Stevenson is said to have protested privately to Senator George here, was to torpedo an independent Democratic party Formosan policy based on cooperation with the United Nations.

All that remains of what might have been a Democratic position on Formosa are the three "understandings" which the Senate Foreign Relations Committee wrote into the report accompanying the mutual security pact to the Senate. Never was a majority party gulled so cheaply. The committee "understands" that we are not obligated to support Chiang in an attack on the mainland, that the area to be protected cannot be extended beyond Formosa and the Pescadores without the Senate's approval and that the terms of the treaty shall not be construed as affecting the legal status or sovereignty of Formosa. These "understandings" have neither legal validity nor political reality. To make a treaty with the "Republic of China" is to recognize its sovereignty, Chiang as the other party to the treaty is in no way bound by what our Senate "understands."

For New York Readers

New York friends of the Weekly invite New York subscribers to a coffee "klatzch" Friday evening March 4 at the New York Newspaper Guild clubhouse, 133 W. 44th Street, for an informal get-together with IFS. No admission, no speeches, no collection, just a chance to say hello.

To Your Friends If You Just Send Us Their Names and Addresses

More Odds Than Ends: Crooked Oil Man and Hollywood Intellectual

Money Counts Where Ideas Don't: All through our law, like a bright and revealing thread, there runs a double standard of treatment, one for money and men of money, the other for ideas and men of ideas. The sharp contrast may again be found in Ring Lardner Jr.'s suit against Twentieth Century Fox Film which the Supreme Court last week refused to hear . . . When Harry Sinclair refused to answer questions in the Teapot Dome oil scandals and was held in contempt, the courts held that contempt does not involve moral turpitude. This was settled law until the Lardner case. Lardner, one of the Hollywood Ten, was awarded \$25,000 in back pay by a jury in a suit for breach of contract by Twentieth Century which fired him after his appearance before the House Un-American Activities Committee. The jury held that Lardner's refusal on First Amendment grounds to answer questions as to his political views was not "moral turpitude" and therefore not cause for discharge under the typical "public disrepute" clause of his movie contract . . . But the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the verdict on the ground that as a matter of law the refusal to answer was moral turpitude, despite the Sinclair case. One law for a crooked oil man protecting his swag, another for an intellectual invoking the First Amendment to protect his freedom of opinion.

Dickie Boy's Theologico-Politicus: When Nixon in Guatemala paid tribute to the Catholic Church as one of "the major bulwarks against Communism", he stepped right into a complicated political situation, foot-in-mouth. The Church may or may not be a bulwark against communism but has certainly been a bulwark against progress in Guatemala. When the Liberals came to power there in the 1870's they had to exile the Archbishop and disestablish the Church, which was a bulwark of feudalism. Even the current President, Carlos Castillo Armas, though a product of counter-revolution and United Fruit Company intervention, finds the Church too backward for his taste, and has resisted pressure to re-establish the Catholic Church as the official State religion, complained of Church interference in the elections for the constituent assembly and is on none too friendly terms with the Archbishop Nixon praised. When Dickie Boy asked His Grace whether there was still Communism in Guatemala, the Archbishop replied, "There is always communism among certain classes." The poor and the idealistic will always bear watching, as will those who take the Gospel too seriously . . .

Mendes-France and Indo China: Last week's issue of *L'Express*, which is Mendes-France's closest journalistic supporter, claims that Washington, allied with his enemies in the Assembly, went into action on the eve of his fall to block his plan for stabilizing Indo-China by an agreement with

Ho Chi-minh. For France an agreement with Ho would be a chance to maintain business and cultural contacts with all of Indo-China, North and South. U.S. policy prefers a new "38th Parallel" . . .

Socio-Political Note: Prince Hubertus zu Loewenstein was guest of honor here Tuesday at a party given by Freda Uteley . . .

Footnote on Dementia Americana for the Future Historian: "Without their knowledge," Walter Winchell reported Feb. 13, "the entire cast of the new play, 'The Desperate Hours', was thoroughly screened for any trace of subversive affiliations. Because Robert Montgomery [the director] is So Close to the President." . . . Probably afraid Bulganin might steal some of his golf secrets . . .

South-East Asia Citadel of Freedom (and The Dope Traffic): A delayed dispatch from its special correspondent in Singapore published by the New York *Daily News* February 13, quotes a British customs official as saying that "Thailand, where opium dens are wide open, has become the center of most Southeast Asian opium peddled by international racketeers." . . . And after those news stories about China flooding the world with opium, "The British spokesman said Red China's contribution to the international drug racket appears to be the smallest of all." . . .

Add Famous American Last Words: "The Bill of Rights and the Constitution are controversial, and not to be posted on the bulletin board"—order issued by Rear Admiral (ret.) Orville E. Gregor after finding these obviously subversive documents posted on the bulletin board of the California Division of Architecture in Los Angeles . . . **Quiver of the Lip Dept.:** "We're not a splinter group," Utah's Gov. T. Bracken Lee at that Lincoln Birthday meeting in Chicago, and Joe McCarthy's "I'm a Republican first and last, root and center; I campaigned for President Eisenhower . . ."

About That Immunity Test: The new immunity law has two parts, one dealing with Grand Juries, the other with Congressional committees. The procedures are quite different. The former is involved in the decision by Federal Judge Weinfeld in New York upholding its constitutionality in the William Ludwig Ullman case. This is another attempt by Brownell to smear the New Deal via the Elizabeth Bentley charges, which Ullman has several times denied under oath. For the best survey of the background of this whole affair, which we hope soon to discuss at greater length, readers are referred to Dan Gillmor's new book, "Fear, The Accuser" (Abelard-Schuman, New York). This is the best study between book covers of the Bentley testimony and the Harry D. White affair.

You Can Help Me by Renewing Now and Sending a Gift Subscription to a Friend

I. F. Stone's Weekly, 301 E. Capitol, Wash. 3, D. C.

Please renew (or enter) my sub for the enclosed \$5:

Name _____

Street _____

City _____ Zone _____ State _____

Enter this gift sub for \$4 more (money enclosed):

(To) Name _____

Street _____

City _____ Zone _____ State _____

2/21/55

I. F. Stone's Weekly

Room 205

301 E. Capitol St., S.E.

Washington 3, D. C.

NEWSPAPER

Entered as
Second Class Mail
Matter
Washington, D. C.
Post Office